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  21. Introduction 
Economic theory predicts that health insurance encourages opportunistic behaviour 
from healthcare providers. We are interested to know if this was occurring among 
health workers in China’s village health stations following the implementation of a 
new community-based health insurance scheme for farmers. Known as the new co-
operative medical scheme (hereafter NCMS), it began in 305 pilot counties in 2003 
but the government hopes to extend coverage to all  rural areas by 2010.   
The ending of China’s agricultural communes in 1982 caused the collapse of 
community-funded healthcare for farmers. Market-oriented reforms of the health 
sector in the 1980s and 1990s had led to privatization of healthcare providers (de 
Geyndt et al. 1992; Meng et al. 2000), and government spending fell from 36.2% of 
total health expenditure in 1980 to 15.2% in 2002 (Centre for Health Statistics and 
Information Ministry of Health 2004). Now most rural residents pay out-of-pocket for 
medical care which is provided on a fee-for-service basis. As rural health is run under 
a separate system from urban health, farmers cannot benefit from such improvements 
in health financing as the national basic medical insurance scheme for urban 
employees set up in 1998. and many poor farmers cannot seek medical treatment 
because of inability to pay (China Daily 2002).   
There was an early attempt to provide financial protection for farmers when the 
government in 1994 piloted a rural community-based medical scheme, an insurance 
scheme pooled from the whole population (10,000-50,000) of the township (Carrin et 
al. 1999). Many of these early insurance schemes closed down mainly because of 
inadequate funding and dwindling political interest, although some survived to the 
new millennium (Jackson et al. 2005). However, Chinese interest in community-based 
health financing continues because the government recently launched a new rural 
community-based medical scheme (NCMS) with some important changes. The new 
insurance scheme draws from the larger population pool (500,000-1 million) of a 
whole county and financial commitments from both provincial and central 
governments (Sun et al. 2007).  
As NCMS is to be extended to the whole of rural China eventually, the question 
confronting Chinese policy makers is what effect has this insurance scheme on 
healthcare providers? Earlier works (Dong, Bogg, Rehnberg et al. 1999; Dong, Bogg, 
Wang et al. 1999) on rural China reported an association between health insurance 
  3and prescribing antibiotics. However, they were conducted before the introduction of 
NCMS and were concerned with outpatient care in the township hospitals (also called 
township health centres). Another study (Zhang et al. 2003) on prescriptions was also 
about township hospitals, and it reported over-prescription and other malpractices. 
This study also focuses on prescribing behaviour but is different in three ways. It is 
firstly concerned with village health stations, the level of delivery below the township 
hospitals; and the most frequently used by farmers because there is a village health 
station in every village. It should be noted that the rural health system comprises three 
levels of healthcare provision – village health stations, township hospitals (or 
township health centres), and county hospitals (the highest level and relatively 
inaccessible to poor farmers).  Secondly, this research conducted in 2005 in Shandong 
Province is perhaps the first field study to collect primary data on China’s new 
community-based medical scheme (NCMS); we collected first-hand information from 
a sample of 30 village health stations. Thirdly, we are unaware of any previous study 
that reports on the effects of the new medical scheme using comparison of a county 
with NCMS and a non-NCMS county. Our study compares Linyi (with NCMS) and 
Qihe (without NCMS). 
 
2.   Methods 
2.1 Study setting 
Linyi (with NCMS) is a typical agricultural county in Shandong with 519,300 
population, 81% were farmers. The average net income of farmers was 3,031yuan in 
2003 (Bureau of Statistics of Linyi County 2004). In 2003, infant mortality was 12.91 
per 1,000 live births and maternal mortality 37.4 per 100,000 live births. 
Qihe County (non-NCMS) was selected for similar geographical, cultural and 
socioeconomic conditions. Total population was 609,100, 83.9% were farmers. The 
average net income of farmers was 3,028 yuan in 2003 (Bureau of Statistics of Qihe 
County 2003). Infant mortality and maternal mortality were 13.89 per 1,000 live 
births and 37.5 per 100,000 live births.  
 
2.2. Sampling of village health stations 
  4A sample of 30 village health stations (VHS) was selected through stratified sampling. 
All townships in both study counties were divided into three tiers of socio-economic 
status (SES): high SES, middle SES and low SES townships, according to SES 
grading by local officials. From each SES stratum, one township was randomly 
chosen. From each of the six selected townships, five villages were randomly chosen 
and all village health stations in the 30 selected villages were investigated. Total 
number of village health stations sampled was 30 because each village had only one 
village health station. Approval was obtained from the Shandong Provincial Bureau of 
Health. 
2.3. Data collection in village health stations 
Village doctors do not usually keep formal medical records of patients. In order to 
obtain information on patient visits, a patient visit record form was designed to collect 
data on patients’ age, sex, NCMS membership, diagnosis, treatment and medical costs. 
The 30 chief village doctors were asked to record every patient visit on the form, 
beginning the day after they received the record forms and continuing for two 
consecutive weeks. These forms were distributed and collected by researchers. The 
field investigation lasted from the end of March 2005 to the end of April 2005.  
2.4. Indicators and Data Analysis 
Village doctors’ prescription behaviour was assessed in four aspects:  
(1) the number of drugs per patient visit; 
(2) whether the prescription included antibiotics;  
(3) the method of drug administration (oral/external or injection); and  
(4) total medical costs per patient visit. 
We compared these indicators between NCMS and non-NCMS village health stations 
to reflect the difference in prescribing behaviour. Within the NCMS villages in Linyi, 
NCMS members and non-NCMS members were compared to reflect difference in 
prescribing behaviour for the insured and uninsured. All data were analyzed using 
SPSS version 12.0.1.  
 
  53.   Results 
Background of new community-based medical scheme (NCMS) in Linyi County 
NCMS in Linyi began in 2003 with a coverage of 93.5% and rose to 94.6% in 2004. 
Per capita funding of NCMS was 23 yuan (10 yuan from individual and a total of 13 
yuan from various levels of government).  
NCMS benefits cover pharmaceuticals, ambulatory services in village health stations, 
outpatients and inpatients in township hospitals (or township health centres) and in 
county or above level hospitals. Patients at village health stations receive 20% 
discount for medical expenses; village doctors normally keep a record of their 
prescriptions showing the discounts given to patients for which they received 
reimbursements from the NCMS office. Hospital outpatients also directly pay at 
prices discounted at 20%. Inpatients receive 20-75% reimbursement for medical 
expenses, higher reimbursement rates for higher expenses; there is a ceiling of 20,000 
yuan per person per year.   
Of the total available NCMS funds, 70% was allocated to inpatient reimbursements 
and 30% to ambulatory and outpatient services including capitation payments to 
township health centres and village health stations. Each NCMS had contractual 
agreements with various health facilities (e.g. village health stations) relating to 
payment system and delivery of health services.  
3.1. Description of NCMS and non-NCMS patients at 30 village health stations 
In 2005, we recorded 2,271 patient visits in two weeks at the 30 village health stations 
(VHSs): 1,025 to NCMS and 1,246 to non-NCMS VHSs.  There were no significant 
differences (p>0.05) in gender distribution, visit status or age group distribution 
between patients in NCMS and non-NCMS villages (Table 1). Average age was 37.3 
years in NCMS villages and 35.5 years in non-NCMS villages. Generally, about half 
were females, and 70% were first visits for the health condition treated.
  6Table 1   Patients at 30 village health stations (VHSs) in Linyi and Qihe, 2005 
NCMS VHSs  Non-NCMS VHSs 
 
Count % Count % 
p value 
Male 486 47.4 619 49.8 
Female 539 52.6 624  50.2 
Total 1,025 100 1,243  100 
0.258 
Gender 
    
Yes 635 70.4 780 68.2 
No 267 29.6 363  31.8  First visit 
Total 902 100 1,143  100 
0.294 
Yes 947 92.5 0 0 
No 77 7.5 1,246  100 
NCMS 
Member 
Total 1,024 100 1,246  100 
n.a. 
0-4 79 7.9 108 8.7 
5-14 126 12.6 196  15.8 
15-34 247 24.8 303  24.4 
35-59 388 38.9 436  35.1 
60+ 157 15.7 198  16.0 
Age Group 
Total 997 100.0 1,241  100.0 
0.170 
Note: Information for some patients was missing. Therefore, total number of patients for each 
measured indicator varies a little. 
 
Table 2   Patient visits to 15 village health stations (VHSs) in Linyi, 2005 
Members Non-members 
 
Count % Count % 
p value 
Male 452 47.7 34 44.2 
Female 495 52.3 43 55.8 
Total 947 100.0 77 100.0 
>0.5 
Gender 
    
Yes 577 70 57 74 
No 247 30 20 26  First visit 
Total 824 100.0 77 100.0 
>0.5 
0~4 71 7.7 9 12.3 
5~14 112 12.1 14 19.2 
15~34 232 25.1 15 20.5 
35~59 335 36.3 30 41.1 
60~ 174 18.8 5 6.8 
Age Group
Total 924 100.0 73 99.9 
<0.05 
 
  7As for the NCMS villages in Linyi, 92.5% of patient visits were NCMS members. 
There were no significant differences in gender distribution and visit status between 
the insured and uninsured, but age group distribution was significantly different 
(Table 2). Uninsured patients were generally younger than the insured, suggesting that 
there might be adverse selection in joining the NCMS in Linyi County. 
 
3.2. Drug prescribing behaviour of village doctors  
3.2.1 Number of drugs per patient visit 
NCMS village health stations tended to prescribe and sell more drugs than the non-
NCMS (Table 3). NCMS village doctors prescribed an average number of 4.6 drugs 
per patient visit, and 56.5% of patient visits had four or more kinds of drugs. Non-
NCMS village doctors averaged 3.1 drugs per patient visit, and only 26.9% 
prescriptions contained four or more kinds of drugs. The frequency of prescribing 
seven or more drugs was 10 times higher in Linyi than in Qihe. The tendency of 
NCMS village doctors to prescribe more drugs was statistically significant, whether 
measured as the average number of drugs per patient visit (t=-17.908, p<0.001) or as 
proportion of patient visits involving four or more drugs (z=14.277, p<0.001). 
 
Table 3   Number of drugs per patient visit at 30 village health stations (VHSs) in Linyi and 
Qihe, 2005 
NCMS VHSs  Non–NCMS VHSs  Number of Drugs 
per patient visit  Count % Count %
0 2 0.2 4  0.3
1 42 4.1 102  8.2
2 143 14.1 360  29.0
3 255 25.1 443  35.6
4 111 10.9 166  13.4
5 135 13.3 92  7.4
6 114 11.2 50  4.0
≥ 7  215 21.1 26  2.1
Total 1,017 100.0 1,243  100.0
 
 
  8Table 4   Number of drugs per patient visit for insured and non-insured patients at 15 village 
health stations (VHSs) in Linyi, 2005 
NCMS member  Non–NCMS member 
Number of drugs 
Count % Count %
0 2 0.2 0 0.0
1 40 4.3 2 2.6
2 119 12.7 23 29.9
3 237 25.2 18 23.4
4 100 10.6 11 14.3
5 126 13.4 9 11.7
6 109 11.6 5 6.5
≥ 7  206 21.9 9 11.7
Total 939 100.0 77 100.0
 
Table 5   Number of antibiotics per patient visit at 30 village health stations (VHSs) in Linyi 
and Qihe, 2005 
NCMS VHSs  Non–NCMS VHSs  Number of 
antibiotics per 
patient visit 
Count % Count %
0 282 27.6 506 40.7
1 508 49.7 499 40.1
2 179 17.5 193 15.5
≥ 3  54 5.3 45 3.6
Total 1,023 100.0 1,243 100.0
 
Table 6   Number of antibiotics per patient-visit for insured and non-insured at 15 village 
health stations (VHSs) in Linyi, 2005 
NCMS member  Non–NCMS member 
Kinds of Antibiotics  Count % Count %
0 263 27.8 18 23.4
1 464 49.1 44 57.1
2 165 17.5 14 18.2
≥ 3  53 5.6 1 1.3
Total 945 100.0 77 100.0
 
  9As for the NCMS village health stations in Linyi, village doctors prescribed more 
drugs to insured patients. Average number of drugs dispensed for the insured was 4.7, 
significantly higher than 3.9 for the uninsured (t=3.038, p<0.01). For NCMS members, 
57.6% of patient visits resulted in four or more kinds of drugs being prescribed, 
compared to 44.2% for non-NCMS members (z=2.281, p<0.05) (Table 4). 
3.2.2 Whether prescription included antibiotics 
In NCMS village health stations, average number of antibiotics prescribed per visit 
was 1.01 compared with 0.83 in non-NCMS (t=-5.173, p<0.001).  For NCMS village 
doctors, 72.4% of prescriptions included antibiotics (Table 5), significantly higher 
than 59.3% for non-NCMS (z=6.515, p<0.001). The difference in the proportion of 
prescriptions containing three or more kinds of antibiotics between NCMS and non-
NCMS village doctors (5.6% against 3.6%) was also significant at the 0.05 level 
(z=1.970). 
For the NCMS village health stations in Linyi, more than 70% of patient visits by 
both the insured and uninsured resulted in prescriptions with antibiotics. Average 
number of antibiotics prescribed was similar for the insured and uninsured (1.01 
against 0.97, t=0.404, p>0.05). Difference in the frequency of prescribing three or 
more antibiotics was 5.6% for the insured and 1.3% for uninsured (Table 6), but this 
difference was of borderline statistical significance (z=1.623, p=0.05) owing to the 
small number of uninsured recorded.  
3.3. Method of drug administration  
The method of drug administration is an important indicator of service quality 
because of the problem of unsafe injections (Zhuo et al. 2002).  In both study counties, 
60.2% of patient visits resulted in injections; and 42.6% of patients received 
intravenous administration of drugs.  
Nevertheless, the method of drug administration used by NCMS and non-NCMS 
village doctors was significantly different (Table 7).  More patients (65.1%) in NCMS 
village health stations received injections than patients (56.3%) in non-NCMS 
(z=4.232, p<0.001). Intravenous injections were significantly more frequent in NCMS 
villages health stations (45.2% of patient visits) than 33.6% of patient visits in non-
NCMS (z=5.604, p<0.001).  
  10Table 7   Method of drug administration at 30 village health stations (VHSs) in Linyi and 
Qihe, 2005 
NCMS VHSs  Non–NCMS VHSs  Method of drug 
administration  Count % Count %
Oral / External  349 34.9 543 43.7
Intravenous injection  452 45.2 417 33.6
Muscle injection  76 7.6 195 15.7
Mixed methods  123 12.3 87 7.0
Total patients  1,000 100.0 1,242 100.0
 
For the NCMS village health stations in Linyi, the method of drug administration for 
insured and uninsured patients was different, but not statistically significant (Table 8).  
More insured patients than the uninsured (65.7% against 58.4%; z=1.291, p=0.098) 
were administered by injections. Prescriptions administered by intravenous injections 
occurred more often for the insured than the uninsured (50.4% against 40.3%; 
z=1.703, p=0.443).  
Table 8   Method of drug administration for insured and non-insured patients at 15 village 
health stations in Linyi, 2005 
NCMS member  Non-NCMS member  Method of drug 
administration  Count % Count %
Oral / External  316 34.3 32 41.6
Intravenous injection  425 46.1 27 35.1
Muscle injection   74 8.0 2 2.6
Mixed methods  107 11.6 16 20.8
Total patients  922 100.0 77 100.0
 
3.4. Total medical costs per patient visit at village health stations 
Average total medical costs per patient visit were significantly different between 
NCMS and non-NCMS village health stations.  In NCMS villages they averaged 18.1 
yuan, 3.0 yuan higher than the non-NCMS villages (t=-2.911, p<0.001). Drug costs in 
the NCMS villages averaged 16.9 yuan, 2.6 yuan higher than in the non-NCMS 
villages (t=-2.694, p< 0.001).  
  11For the NCMS village health stations in Linyi, average total medical costs for the 
insured (n=879) and uninsured (n=76) were significantly different (t=5.655, p<0.001). 
The insured averaged 18.7 yuan compared to 11.3 yuan for the uninsured. The 
difference in average total drug costs for the insured (17.4 yuan) and uninsured (10.7 
yuan) was of similar magnitude (t=5.527, p<0.001). 
 
4.   Discussion 
Our comparison of village health stations with and without health insurance suggests 
a positive relationship between health insurance and opportunistic behaviour of health 
providers. Our results show that the effect of NCMS was to exaggerate the problem of 
over-prescription and excessive injections that was already occurring in rural 
Shandong. Indeed, malpractices were common in all 30 villages, for example, 65.2% 
of patient visits were prescribed with antibiotics and about 20% of patients had two or 
more kinds of antibiotics.  
Irrational prescribing practices often lead to serious consequences. Multi-drug use 
may increase the risk of undesirable drug interaction since every drug has its own 
side-effects. Excessive and unnecessary prescription of drugs for medical purposes 
will increase the economic burden of patients and waste limited resources. Most 
seriously, overuse of antibiotics can lead to antimicrobial resistance and overuse of 
injections runs the risk of unsafe needles that can increase transmission of AIDS, 
hepatitis B and C, and other blood-borne diseases (Zhuo et al. 2002; Holloway and 
Ivanovska 2003).   
In our study of both NCMS and non-NCMS villages the average number of drugs 
prescribed per patient visit was 3.8 which was higher than the average of 2.2 per 
patient visit found in a study of 17 developing countries (Pavin et al. 2003) where the 
highest recorded was 3.8 found in Indonesia and Nigeria. Furthermore, our study 
found that 65.2% of patients were prescribed antibiotics and 61.2% given injections, 
higher than the 43.1% and 28.7% respectively found among primary health care 
physicians in rural Uzbekistan (Pavin et al. 2003). For China, we found antibiotic use 
in village health stations to be similar to the above-mentioned study by Zhang et al. 
(2003) on township hospitals where 68.3% of prescriptions contained antibiotics. The 
  12implication is that irrational drug use is common in rural China in both the village and 
township levels of healthcare. 
Generally, there is no recognised proper number of drugs per patient visit or pattern of 
drug administration since it depends on medical needs. Unnecessary prescription of 
drugs (particularly antibiotics) and use of injections are widespread throughout the 
world (Holloway and Ivanovska 2003). The significance of our study is it highlights 
the problem in rural China as among the world’s most severe. Indeed, we found that 
about 10% of all patient visits were prescribed seven or more different kinds of drugs; 
the highest number was 15 drugs for a single patient visit.  
How representative is our study? This question is relevant as each county-based 
NCMS is autonomously run on a variation of the NCMS model. We consider Linyi to 
be representative of Shandong because its economy ranks in the middle amongst 
Shandong’s counties. Secondly, funding resources available to Linyi’s NCMS were 
around the middle level for the seven Shandong pilot counties. Thirdly, the benefits 
package of Linyi’s NCMS was similar to most other counties not only in Shandong 
but also in other parts of China, covering pharmaceuticals, ambulatory services in 
village health stations, and hospital outpatient and inpatient services.   
4.1 Explaining over-prescribing behaviour of Chinese village doctors 
Apart from the effects of NCMS to be discussed later, there are important factors that 
could influence village doctors’ prescribing behaviour from the demand and supply 
side of medical care.  
Demand side  
Patient’s income, age, sex, occupation, insurance coverage and cultural background 
may influence willingness to accept a particular drug or a method of drug 
administration, which in turn influence the village doctor’s prescribing behaviour. It is 
known that farmers often ask for injections because they believe injections help them 
recover sooner. Anecdotal evidence suggest that to meet to patient demand, village 
doctors often prescribe multiple medications for simple, self-limited illnesses (such as 
colds) and use intravenous antibiotics for upper respiratory tract infections.  
Supply side  
  13For China, we think that over-prescription and overuse of injections are more likely to 
be initiated by village doctors themselves. There are two main reasons. 
First, inadequate training and medical knowledge of village doctors could lead to 
irrational drug use. Many doctors are former “barefoot doctors” of the early 1980s (de 
Geyndt et al. 1992) with 6-12 months’ training as paramedics (Jackson et al. 1996). 
Indeed they are not formally recognised as medical professionals by the Chinese 
Ministry of Health. Government policy is that in future they will be replaced by 
formally registered medical professionals; for the present, they should be gradually 
retrained to become assistant doctors with accreditation. Indeed, many have improved 
their medical knowledge and skills through in-service training and more and more 
have education up to middle school (9 years’ schooling). But a substantial proportion 
still have extremely low technical competence (de Geyndt et al. 1992), lacking the 
medical knowledge to engage in rational prescribing and proper administration of 
drugs. Our results imply village doctors urgently need more training on rational drug 
use.  
Secondly, the rural healthcare market provides strong incentives for village health 
stations to sell drugs. Among China’s total 551,600 village health stations in 2004, 
30.2% were privately owned (Centre for Health Statistics and Information Ministry of 
Health 2005). Although 59% of them were supposedly owned by village committees 
or jointly with village doctors, most in fact were run as private clinics because village 
committees do not normally provide any financial support.   
It has been noted (Bloom et al. 2000; Bloom and Fang 2003) that the private status of 
village health stations and fee-for-service system provide strong incentives for health 
workers to induce demand for services. Without financial help from the government 
or the village collective, health workers are expected make a living from selling drugs 
and fee-for-service payments. Most village doctors do not charge consultation fees (in 
NCMS villages they receive a small capitation) and they can earn money from only a 
limited number of services including injections, acupuncture, massage. Thus, village 
doctors rely heavily on selling drugs. Under China’s drug mark-up policy they can 
sell drugs at higher prices, marked up from wholesale prices, to make a profit. 
Whenever possible they would prescribe more drugs and expensive drugs. Our results 
imply that the drug mark-up policy by which village doctors sell drugs to make a 
living should be changed. 
  144.2 Effect of NCMS on village doctors’ prescribing behaviour 
Our study of village health stations that came under China’s newest rural health 
insurance in 2003, support the findings of the earlier studies of township hospitals 
(Dong, Bogg, Rehnberg et al. 1999; Dong, Bogg, Wang et al. 1999) that reported an 
association between health insurance and prescribing behaviour. Importantly, we 
found that incentives for over-prescribing did not decline with introduction of the 
NCMS payment method (including capitation payment). On the contrary, NCMS 
village health stations tend to over-prescribe more often than non-NCMS.  But this 
need not have to happen. 
Theoretical and empirical literature suggest that a pro-active policy on healthcare 
purchasing could improve performance - both the efficiency and quality of providers 
(Perrot 2004). Purchasing healthcare under NCMS covers three key issues: what to 
purchase, from whom to purchase (contracting), and how to pay providers?  NCMS’s 
contracting network of purchasing healthcare consists of county-level hospitals, 
township hospitals and village health centres. NCMS contracts are important to these 
health facilities because “money follows patients”, and their funding resources depend 
greatly on the ability to attract patients. We think that NCMS could more forcefully 
define their quality requirements in the contracts, similar to those for “managed care” 
in the USA. Then Chinese health providers are forced to improve service quality to 
meet contract requirements. The implication of our findings is that the NCMS could 
be given a more influential role on the behaviour of health providers. It should have 
the capacity to design, monitor and enforce contracts that compel providers pay 
attention to quality improvements.  
Provider payment methods can contribute to quality improvement with the right 
incentives for health providers, and the NCMS should have enough financial clout on 
providers.  However, our study found that NCMS payments to providers were too 
small to be influential for two reasons. First, NCMS village health stations received a 
capitation payment which was a fixed amount based on the size of the population they 
served. At 3 yuan/person it was too low to overcome the systemic incentives to over-
prescribe.  Secondly, NCMS patients had a high rate of co-payment of about 80% and 
thus NCMS’s power over health providers was weak.    
Even if NCMS’s provider payment method is improved, we believe it would not work 
without reforming the existing incentives for selling drugs across the rural health 
  15system. Excessive prescriptions and unnecessary injections can only be stopped when 
the undesirable incentives disappear in a radical reform of the rural health system.  
 
5.   Conclusions  
Introduction of China’s newest health insurance scheme had adversely influenced 
prescribing behaviour in village health stations, but irrational drug prescription also 
occurred in those without insurance. We draw two conclusions.  
First, the NCMS had unintentionally encouraged village doctors to prescribe more 
drugs, use more antibiotics, and they were more likely to use injections than those in 
non-NCMS villages. The cost per patient visit in NCMS villages was higher than non-
NCMS; even within the NCMS village health stations the difference between insured 
and uninsured patients was the higher cost for the insured. Thus, health providers 
under the NCMS seemed to have raised the cost of patient visit, especially through 
supplying more drugs, costly drugs and administration by injections. If unchecked, 
there would be cost escalation in NCMS areas. 
Secondly, irrational drug prescription behaviour also occurred in village health 
stations without NCMS. Our evidence from village health stations with and without 
health insurance showed that multi-drugs were prescribed too often, and antibiotics 
and injections used in high proportions. The incentive to sell more drugs and 
expensive drugs exists because of (1) government policy on drug sales and (2) private 
status of village health stations which are left to run without any public funding. 
We have three policy recommendations. First, the NCMS should be designed so that it 
could exert stronger financial influence over the health providers to motivate them to 
improve service quality and contain costs. Second, to counter irrational drug use there 
should be improved medical training for village doctors. Lastly, the present systemic 
incentives for selling and over-prescribing drugs in village health stations could be 
removed through a radical reform of the rural health system. This task is not 
impossible but requires much effort; we think the NCMS can work for the good of the 
rural population but only if this is carried out. Health service quality and drug safety 
in the rural areas should be a public concern in China. 
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